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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE <pF UTAH 
DELWYN G. TAYLOR and NANCY L. TAYLOR, 
his wifef and ELSIE E. CURTIS, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
p R Q p E S S I 0 N A L U N I T E D B u n j 3 E R , s 
SUPPLY, INC. and FLOYD E . BENTON, 
individually, 
Appellants - Petitioners 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
The questions Presented for Review 
Did the Court of Appeals so far depart] from the accepted 
and usual course of judicial proceedings ^s to call for an 
exercise • of the Supreme Coi irt .'s power of si ipervision; 
1. By allowing a lower court to alt^r the terms of a 
judgement after entry so that the court could enforce a 
stipulation agaii ist :>:t: i ] y 01 w:::i c: Ide of tl: :ie ] i ti gat ion; 
2. By allowing sumrtary judgement according to 
stipulation to stand when there existed a factual dispute as to 
the terms of the stipulation; 
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3. By misinterpreting an occurance to be a detriment to 
respondents instead of a windfall and letting that 
misinterpretation influence their judgement; 
4. By allowing unusually harsh sanctions for the mere late 
compliance with the stipulation in that performcince for the other 
side was excused? 
5. By failing to ascertain that the Appellants maintained 
that the stipulated payment was meant to be segregated with the 
result that either a portion of the judgment should have been 
returned as the party owing that portion of the stipulated amount 
had filed bankruptcy or the summary judgment should have been 
vacated because of the presence of a factual dispute. 
The Court of Appeals rendered a not-for-publication opinion 
in this matter on December 2, 1987, a copy of which is attached 
in an appendix. 
Jurisdiction to review by a writ of certiorari is proper 
pursuant to UCA 78-2-2(3)(a) and UCA 78-2a-4. The decision sought 
to be reviewed was entered on December 2,1987 in the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the case 
This matter involves the one-sided enforcment of a 
stipulation between parties according to summary judgment when 
the terms of the stipulation were in dispute. 
- 2 -
in'"oui se cif Proceeding*.; 
The Third District Court in Salt Lake County rendered a 
summary judgment against Appellants on motipn respondents 
according to the partiaJ terms of a stipulation. After Appellants 
unsuccessfully sought to have both sides o£ the stipulation 
enforced by fiip district coin I ,. npf^al wai hjRpn in tU (ourl nl 
Appeals. Not receiving any relief from the Court of Appeals, 
Appellant petitions for a Writ of Certiorari for review by this 
• :::oui:t 
Statement of Facts 
The parties were involved in ] itigatioft below which was 
settled at a pretrial conference by stipulation]. The stipulation 
was oral with no document setting forth the contents and terms of 
the stipulation ever having been signed by tlfie parties or the 
judge. No citation to the record is made as there is no such 
ilcx/uinetit I, iiillhoijqli rounstji I m teisiKJtiileiiil piepaied ciii urder 
Pursuant to Stipulation which is in the record at pages 65 to 67 
in its unsigned state. The onlj undisputed terms * the 
r::t:ipulat ic i :t we re I 1 ul Appellai its we -i 'e to pay to 
respondents within 30 days and that respondent^ were to deliver 
title to a motorhome to Appellants and hold Appellants harmless 
It oin air, I lent) ut i i aims to the motorhome* See page 2 of 
respondents' brief and page 4 of Appellantsf[ brief. Because 
Appellants cited several provisions 'rew\ iResj-oncletiti *' I'udfr 
Pursuant to Stipulation in Appellants1 brief to illustrate 
undisputed terms of the stipulation, the Court of Appeals 
erroneously believed that Appellants had adopted that entire 
document as correctly reflecting the stipulated terms. See page 4 
of the opinion, 4th sentence of the 1st full paragraph. Tterms 
allowing sanctions are still disputed. Also terms of the 
stipulation concerrning which respondents were to receive which 
part of the $17,750 are also disputed. Page 138 of the record. 
Appellants had some difficulties with a land transaction 
and were unable to make the payment of the $17,750. Respondents 
then made a motion for summary judgement and noticed the hearing 
on the motion for October 31, 1983. Because of a clerical errorf 
Appellants' counsel appeared one hour late after the motion was 
granted. Pages 88 and 89 of the record. Thereafter, a judgement 
was prepared by respondents' counsel and signeci by the judge on 
November 4, 1983. The order unambiguously designates an award 
of $17,750 in accordance with the stipulation and an award of 
$250 for attorney's fees as a sanction. Page 82 of the record. 
Appellants have been unsuccessful at getting the summary 
judgement set aside or getting the other half of the stipulation 
enforced. See record at pages 86 to 96, 126 to 140, 153 to 158 
166 to 168, 173 20m 177 and 192 to 202. The judge ultimately 
claimed the judgement a sanction in its entirety in an attenpt to 
justify the uneven enforcement of the stipulation. Page 205 
paragraph 4 of the record. 
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Partway through the process, Appellant Benton filed a 
chapter ±± uankruptc -1 * / — !aoed an automatic stay 
against collection - .,•* u.:: was to be paid to 
respondant Curtis out of the a7,750 payment because the $5,000 
% . - .«:;..,.-,.,: - . ^ ivel y against Benton. 
The lower court refused to honor the automatic stay and permitted 
collection of the $5,000 from the corporate Appellant. See pages 
The motorhome Appellants were to receive was sold by 
respondents at an execution solo which wv.\ marked by n.regularity 
as the sale was not properly noticed as tl4 lienholder, who was 
the ultimate buyer, received j \*- only noticfe. (page 164 of the 
record) T • w:ii 1 .1 i t :1 :ie ] i enl lolder then 
dismissing an action for the $12,000 balance owing oii the 
motorhome, making t rv effective sale fori $13,000, for which 
Appelljnli 'Mil1, . < in lit i t.i VI, QUI' -ip ^ Of 
Respondent's brief. The Court of Appeals ^as unaware of this 
dismissal as evidenced by the last sentence df the fi rst foot .note 
< : f their opinion. 
Sunmary of argument 
Stipulations should m>1 IN1 enforced iml> one way, 
particularly where it imposes tremendous burden on one side while 
granting a windfall to the other side. Unambiguous judgments 
shoi :0 ci i lot be al te :i ed, but s In >uJ d stai id or f al ] o:i i 1 :hei i: original 
signed form. The rule that summary judgments based on 
_
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stipulations may not be set aside for excusable neglect must be 
tempered when factual disputes exist as to terms of the 
stipulation. The Utah state courts should respect the 
jurisdiction of the United States Bankruptcy Court as to the 
automatic stay when bankruptcy actions commence. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The judgement prepared by respendantfs counsel and 
signed by the judge clearly purports to enforce a stipulation 
between the parties. The order reads, 
1. That Plaintiff be awarded Judgement against 
defendants in the amount of $17,750, in accordance 
with the Stipulation heretofore referred to, plus 
interest at the legal rate from the date of judgement 
hereof. 
2. That Plaintiff's Attorney, Stott P. Harston of 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin be awarded the 
amount of $250.00 as a sanction against defendants 
for the necessity of counsel bringing the Motion for 
Summary Judgement and for sanctions. 
(Page 82 of the record.) 
If the court can enforce one side of the stipulation why 
can't it enforce the other side? Uneven enforcment of a 
stipulation is clearly an abuse of judicial discretion. That the 
stipulation provided for Respondents to give Appellants clear 
title to the motorhome has never been disputed. Why was that 
provision left out of the judgement? 
Counsel for respondent and the judge later tried to avoid 
this claim by characterizing the entire judgment as a sanction 
against appellant. But the order clearly designates the $17,750 
- 6 -
as in accordance with the stipulation with the S250 for 
attorney,s fees as the only sanction. If the judgment was for 
sanctions then why was the judgment not initially prepared 
accordingly? "If the language of a judgement is clear and 
unambiguous,it must be enforced as it speaks." Park City Utah 
l 
Corporation v. Ensign Conpany, 586 P.2d 44b. So the judgement 
must be enforced, if at all, as it speaks, as a judgement 
according to stipulation. As such it canipt stand as it is a 
one-sided abuse of discretion. 
2. Even if the judgement could be cl^aracterized as being 
for sanctions, the availability of sMch sanctions was 
sufficiently in factual dispute as to reqiiire the granting of 
Appellant fs timely Rule 60(b) motion to set aside for excusable 
neglect. "(D)iscretion should be exerciser in furtherance of 
justice and should incline towards granting Relief in a doubtful 
case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Helgeson v. 
Inyangumia,636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) a^ cited by the Court 
of Appeals in their opinion on page 5. Tfie rule in Kopel v. 
Davie, 163 Colo. 57, 428 P.2d 712 (Colo.1967) that parties cannot 
move to vacate a judgement entered pursuant Ito a stipulation on 
grounds of excusable neglect makes no sense w)ien the terms of the 
stipulation are in factual dispute. Thq Court of Appeals 
recognized on page 2 of their opinion under Disputed Issues of 
Facts that material factual disputes as to the elements of a 
stipulation will preclude the entry of summary judgement. The 
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court just failed to recognize that there were and are factual 
disputes as to the terms of the stipulation. The availability of 
sanctions for nonperformance of the stipulation and the 
divisibility of the $17 ,750 payment between the respondents have 
always been in dispute. Reference to portions of the proposed 
order prepared by respondents1 counsel to show undisputed terms 
of the stipulation did not constitute an adoption of the entire 
document as an accurate reflection of the stipulation as 
misapprehended by the Court of Appeals. 
3. The undisputed portions of the stipulation, if 
followed, would have yielded the following results. The 
Appellants would have received a motorhome free and clear of all 
liens and paid $17,750 to respondents. The respondents would 
have received $17,750 from which they would have had to pay off 
the claims against the motorhome, which were somewhere between 
$10,000 and $12f000. As it turns out, Appellant had to pay the 
cash, but did not get the motorhome. The motorhome was sold at 
an execution sale by the respondents to the lienholder for $1,000 
which was credited to Appellant. After the sale, the lienholder 
dismissed the action against respondents in what was in essence 
payment under the table in the amount of $12,000, for which 
Appellant received no credit. This is all admitted in 
Respondents brief on page 16, but the Court of Appeals missed 
it. So the Respondents got the $17,750 in cash and were allowed 
to keep it all as the action by the lienholder was dismissed 
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according to some apparently collusive arrangement made at the 
sale of the motorhome. Respondents clearly received a windfall 
over what they had bargained for in the stipulation. A close 
reading of the Court of Appeals opinion reveals that the court 
did rely on the potential detrimental effects of the lienholder 
suit against the respondents in upholding the lower courtfs 
actions. Respondents ultimately benefited from the situation to 
the clear detriment of Appellants. If the Court of Appeals 
decision is based on the erroneous assumption that a portion of 
the cash garnished from Appellants went to pay off the obligation 
on the motorhome instead of into respondents pocket, then the 
judgement should be readjusted on that basiq 
4. Even if the summary judgment 
factual dispute, and even if the initial order can be changed 
from enforcing the stipulation to be 
Appellants, the order is so harsh that 
sanction would be an abuse of discretion. 
that Appellants made late payment according to the stipulation. 
The remedy for the non-payment of money is interest (Reed v. 
Armstrong, 6 U.2d 291, 312 P.2d 777 and Walker v. Rocky Mountain 
Recreation Corp., 29 U.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538.) not the release of 
the other side of the bargain while still demanding payment. If 
respondents wanted to avoid having to deliver clear title to the 
motorhome, they should have sought to rescind the stipulation. 
As it is, they got to "have their cake ajid eat it too" while 
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alone. 
stands for want of 
a sanction against 
to enforce it as a 
The bottom line is 
depriving Appellants from any benefit they were to derive from 
the stipulation. Nothing was lost to respondents by the 
lienholder suit on the motorhome as the suit was dismissed, thus 
relieving respondents from paying the balance on the lien which 
became a $12,000 windfall to respondants. The equity in the 
motorhome was lost to Appellants when respondents conducted the 
collusive execution sale where Appellants only got credit for 
$1,000 of the $13,000 that effective changed hands. 
5. Appellant Benton in his affidavit on page 138 of the 
record averred that $5f000 of the stipulated amount was to go to 
Respondent Curtis. The only claim that Curtis had in the lawsuit 
was a personal claim against Benton. When Benton filed a Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy proceeding, all actions against him personally were 
stayed pursuant to the automatic stay in 11 USCA Section 
362(a)(1). But respondents still collected the divisible part of 
the stipulated payment that could be attributed to Benton 
personally from the corporate Appellant in disregard of Federal 
bankruptcy law and the jurisdiction of the Federal court system. 
The $5,000 must be returned under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
Respondents claimed in their brief that because the 
divisibility of the payment was not mentioned in the summary 
judgment order, the entire amount could be collected from either 
Appellant. This is just another point that shows that at the 
least Appellants1 URCP Rule 60B should have been granted as a 
factual dispute existed as to terms of the stipulation. 
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SUMMARY 
A stipulation was made between the parties. Respondents 
have gotten the full measure of the benefits to be given them 
under the agreement. Appellants have yet 
Respondents used the stipulation to get 
against Appellants and then repudiated tlpe stipulation after 
enforcing performance in full by Appellants.] Such actions should 
never have been sanctioned by either the qistrict Court or the 
Court of Appeals. 
Dated the 4th day of January, 1988. 
to receive anything, 
a summary judgement 
Ronald C. Barker, 
Attorney for[ Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 4th da^ of January, 1988, I 
caused a copy of the foregoing to be mailed 
P.O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603. 
to Stott P. Harston, 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
DEC 319 8 7 
Delwyn G. Taylor and 
Nancy L. Taylor, his wife, 
and Elsie E. Curtis, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Professional United Builders 
Supply, Inc., and Floyd E. 
Benton, individually, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson and Davidson. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Cfase No. 860039-CA 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
F I L E D 
DEC 2 1987 
Timothy M Shea 
Cierfc of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendants, Professional United Builderfs Supply, Inc. 
(Professional) and Floyd E. Benton (Benton) appeal a judgment 
entered in favor of plaintiffs, Delwyn Gi Taylor, Nancy L. 
Taylor (the Taylors) and Elsie E. Curtis (Curtis). Defendants 
seek to vacate the judgment and remand Of to enforce the 
parties1 settlement agreement. 
I. 
FACTS 
In January 1982, plaintiffs brought kn action against 
defendants claiming that: 1) Curtis loaned Benton $15,000 in 
January 1980, $5,000 of which was still owing; 2) the Taylors 
had signed three uniform real estate contracts as buyers which 
real property to them 
: sell the property for 
transferred title to a 
Benton represented would transfer certaii 
at no cost and allow the Taylors to late] 
profit; 3) over a year later the Taylors 
motor home to Benton or Professional as credit on some 
properties and Benton or Professional agreed to assume $363 per 
month payments owed on the motor home to Citicorp; and 4) 
Benton or Professional made payments to Citicorp for about ten 
months but discontinued making the payments in September 1980. 
Plaintiffs* complaint sought payment of $5,000 to Curtis, 
a determination that the uniform real estate contracts were 
null and void# possession of the motor home, payment of 
arrearages on the $363/month obligation to Citicorp, and 
$600/month damages for the Taylors1 loss of use of the motor 
home. 
During a pretrial conference, the parties entered into an 
oral stipulation that defendants would pay plaintiffs $17,750 
within thirty days of August 22, 1983, and plaintiffs, in turn, 
would deliver to defendants clear title to the motor home. 
They also agreed that sanctions would be imposed if either 
party failed to perform. Defendants failed to comply with the 
stipulation. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment 
and sanctions which was heard pursuant to notice at 9:00 a.m. 
on October 31, 1983. Defendants1 attorney did not appear to 
oppose the motion and it was granted. 
At 10:11 a.m. on the day of the hearing, defendants filed 
an affidavit in opposition to the motion, On November 4, 1983, 
judgment was entered awarding plaintiffs $17,750 plus interest 
and $250 in attorney fees. On November 16, 1983, defendants 
filed a motion to file an amended answer and counterclaim and a 
motion to vacate the summary judgment. Defendants' motion 
alleged that the affidavit filed on the day of the hearing 
demonstrated that issues of fact existed which precluded entry 
of summary judgment. Defendants also contended that their 
attorney's secretary erroneously noted the time of the hearing 
causing him to miss the hearing. The court denied the motion 
to vacate. 
In January of 1984, plaintiffs commenced execution 
proceedings on their $17,750 judgment against defendants. A 
sheriff's sale of the motor home was conducted, at which 
Intermountain Sports bid and purchased the motor home for 
$1,000.* Plaintiffs also obtained a garnishee judgment 
against a company owing money to Professional. Execution on 
that judgment fully satisfied plaintiffs' judgment against 
defendants. 
1. The Taylors had purchased the motor home from Intermountain 
Sports. The purchase was financed through Citicorp, apparently 
on a recourse basis. When the loan went into default, 
Intermountain repurchased the subject note from Citicorp. In 
February 1983, Intermountain Sports sued the Taylors for the 
balance owing on the note. At some point in time, Intermountain 
repossessed the motor home. The record before us does not 
indicate whether Intermountain Sports obtained a money judgment 
against the Taylors. 
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On January 31, 1984, plaintiffs fil< 
judgment and a motion to set aside the 0< 
against Benton due to his pending bankru] 
aside the judgment with regard to Benton 
defendants filed an -Amendment and Suppli 
Declare Judgment Satisfied, and Motion f< 
Plaintiffs.*2 According to defendants, 
August 22, 1983 stipulation requiring pl< 
defendants clear title to the motor home 
enforced. Since clear title was not del: 
asserted the value of the motor home was 
March 5, 1984, the court entered an orde: 
filed by defendants and stating that the 
judgment was not merely an extension of 
but was a sanction for defendants* noncoi 
stipulation. This appeal followed. 
id a satisfaction of 
tober 31 judgment 
tcy. The court set 
On February 10, 1984, 
ment To Motion To 
r Judgment Against 
he portion of the 
intiffs to deliver to 
should have been 
vered, defendants 
owed to defendants. On 
denying the motions 
November 4, 1983 
he parties1 stipulation 
ipliance with the 
Defendants contend the trial court irred in: 1) refusing to 
vacate the summary judgment where disputed issues of material 
fact existed; 2) refusing to vacate the judgment which was 
entered as a result of excusable neglect] and 3) failing to order 
reimbursement of $5,000 to Benton because of his bankruptcy. 
II. 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF ^ ACT 
Defendants first contention is that the trial court erred 
in refusing to vacate the summary judgment on the grounds that 
material disputes of material fact existed. The judgment entered 
by the court was based on the parties* stipulation, not the 
issues framed by the complaint and other pleadings. Therefore, 
we confine our analysis to whether or not there were material 
factual disputes as to the elements of tne stipulation only. 
When a party refuses to perform its obligations under a 
stipulation, the court is empowered to enter judgment embodying 
the terms of the stipulation. Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 
445 P.2d 144, 146 (1968). The affidavitIfiled by plaintiffs in 
support of their motion for summary judgment states, in material 
part, that: (1) defendants had agreed to 
within thirty days; (2) defendants failed to pay that sum; (3) 
the trial court had said sanctions would 
party failed to comply with the stipulati 
failure to pay the stipulated amount had 
plaintiffs because of a suit filed by Intermountain Sports for in 
excess of $16,000. A proposed order, ref 
pay plaintiffs $17,750 
be considered if either 
on; and (4) defendants' 
resulted in prejudice to 
lecting the terms of the 
2. This followed a Motion to Declare Judgment Satisfied In Part 
and Ascertain Disposition of Garnished Fiends, filed by 
defendants on February 1, 1984. 
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stipulation prepared by plaintiffs' counsel, includes the 
additional provision that plaintiffs were to transfer title to 
the motor home to one or both defendants. 
Defendants' affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment 
was not timely filed and/ therefore, was not before the court 
when it granted the motion.3 However, even if the affidavit 
had been timely filed, it did not refute that defendants had 
stipulated to payment of $17,750 within thirty days and had 
failed to pay that amount within the specified time. Nor did 
the affidavit deny that their failure to pay resulted in 
Intermountain Sports' suit against the Taylors. Further, 
although the affidavit does dispute the reference to sanctions 
in plaintiffs' affidavit, a later filing by defendants adopts 
plaintiffs' proposed order pursuant to stipulation as correctly 
reflecting the settlement terms, including the possibility of 
sanctions. Therefore, there were no material issues of fact as 
to the terms of the stipulation which would preclude entry of 
summary judgment. 
In February 1984, defendants filed a motion for judgment 
against plaintiffs. The motion appears to claim that 
plaintiffs owe defendants money because they did not provide 
clear title to the motor home to defendants, as was 
stipulated. The timeliness of this motion is, again, 
questionable. However, the trial court had before it 
uncontroverted evidence that the failure of defendants to pay 
the $17,750 within thirty days had resulted in suit by 
Intermountain Sports against the Taylors and repossession of 
the motor home by Intermountain Sports.4 Therefore, 
plaintiffs' failure to perform was caused by the action of 
defendants which made it impossible for plaintiffs to perform. 
Furthermore, the parties* stipulation had contemplated 
possible sanctions for failure to perform. Parties to 
litigation may, at their option, enter into a settlement 
stipulation providing that if one fails to perform, judgment 
may be entered which differs from the performance required 
under the stipulation. Vallev Nat'l Bank v. Sensitronics, 
Inc., 497 P.2d 354, 357 (Colo. 1972). In this case 
3. Defendants also filed an untimely Motion to Strike Affidavit, 
addressed to portions of plaintiffs' affidavit. This motion does 
not, however, refute the material portions of the stipulation 
reflected in the judgment. 
4. A portion of the $17,750 was to have been used to pay off the 
motor home loan and thereby obtain clear title to the motor home. 
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it was stipulated that if a party did ndt comply with the 
settlement terms sanctions would be imposed. Judgment was 
entered accordingly. Therefore# we find no error in the 
courtfs entry of judgment under the factls of this case. 
III. 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
Defendants' second claim is that thel court erred in 
refusing to vacate the judgment on the grounds that their 
attorney's failure to attend the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment was due to excusable neglect. Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b) provides: 
On motion and upon such terms! as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect . . . . 
The trial court is given broad disc 
whether to grant or deny a motion to vac 
excusable neglect under Utah R. Civ. P. 
v. Houohton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 198 
Invanoumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 19 
should be exercised in furtherance of ju; 
towards granting relief in a doubtful ca 
party may have a hearing." Helgesen, 63 
cases where summary judgment is entered 
the parties cannot move to vacate the ju< 
excusable neglect. Kopel v. Davie. 163 
714 (1967). 
retion in deciding 
ite on the grounds of 
>0(b). Valley Leasing 
); Helqesen v. 
H). H [Discretion 
;tice and should incline 
;e to the end that the 
P.2d at 1081. In 
mrsuant to stipulation, 
Igment based on 
:olo. 57, 428 P.2d 712, 
Under Kopel, even if excusable neglect were present in this 
case, it would be irrelevant because the 
pursuant to the stipulation entered into 
court's judgment was 
by the parties in 
August of 1983. In Kopel, the parties entered into a 
stipulation which resulted in the entry of a summary judgment. 
Subsequently, a substituted defendant moved to vacate the 
judgment on the basis of inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld denial of the 
motion as it did not involve a "default judgment in the true 
sense of the word, but a stipulated judgment; consequently, 
there was no mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect.* is!, at 714. The court further noted that a valid 
stipulation had occurred, without fraud or professional 
incompetence by any party or legal counsel. A similar result 
appropriate in this case. Defendants' failure to attend the 
is 
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hearing on the motion for summary judgment, whether excusable or 
not, is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the 
stipulation upon which the judgment was based, a question not 
raised by defendants. 
IV. 
BANKRUPTCY 
Defendants* third claim of error that the judge erred in 
failing to order reimbursement of the $5,000 collection on the 
judgment to Benton due to his bankruptcy is without merit. The 
judgment was against both defendants and was in fact, satisfied 
by garnishing professional's sale of property. Therefore, the 
judgment was paid by Professional rather than Benton. Although 
the complaint originally claimed that Benton owed Curtis the 
money, the answer filed on behalf of Professional admits that 
Professional owes the debt to Curtis, denying that Benton is 
obligated. 
Affirmed. Costs against defendants,, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
860039-CA 6 
